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Minnesota criminalizes five degrees of Criminal Sexual Conduct (“CSC”).  The base 
conduct prohibited in fifth degree CSC is nonconsensual sexual contact.  The four higher degrees 
of CSC require one or more aggravating elements in addition to a nonconsensual sexual act.  The 
two aggravating elements which distinguish the degrees of CSC in Minnesota are force and 
personal injury.  These aggravators are supposed to separate out the worst offenses and offenders 
for the harshest punishment.  But problematic statutory definitions and judicial interpretations 
have created overlap in the meaning of force and injury.  Because the same conduct satisfies both 
the force and injury elements, there is no difference between the degrees of CSC—higher and 
lower degrees of CSC prohibit exactly the same conduct.  This means defendants who engage in 
identical conduct can receive vastly different sentences.  As currently written and enforced by 
the courts, Minnesota’s CSC statutes violate equal protection under the Minnesota Constitution.
2
   
The legislature should act swiftly to remedy this problem. 
II. Background 
Courts and legislatures have long struggled to define the crime of rape.  At common law, 
rape was defined as carnal knowledge of a woman not one’s wife, forcibly and against her will.”
3
  
The common law definition of rape also required that the woman resist her assailant “to the 
                                              
1
  Jenna Yauch-Erickson is a 2011 graduate of William Mitchell College of Law.  Jenna is currently clerking 
for the Honorable Myron H. Bright on the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.   
 
2
  See infra, Part V; Minn. Const. art. I § 2; State v. Cox, 798 N.W.2d 517 (Minn. 2011). 
 
3
  4 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Law of England 210 (Univ. Chi. Press 1979) (1769). 
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utmost” of her physical capacity.
4
  The common law definition of rape had many problems.  The 
utmost resistance requirement made rape nearly impossible to prove—few, if any, women could 
meet the high standard of physical resistance.
5
  A definition of rape that requires any level of 
resistance is problematic because it makes criminal liability dependent on the actions of the 
victim, not the assailant.  Also, requiring resistance leads to difficult questions about how much 
resistance is enough and what kind of resistance counts.
6
  Moreover, the utmost resistance 
requirement had a harmful effect on victims because it required women to increase their risk of 
injury in order to prove they were raped, and sent the message that inadequate resistance meant 
there was no rape at all.  Other elements of common law rape definitions also placed a heavy 
emphasis on the actions and state of mind of rape victims.  For example, both the elements of 
force and nonconsent were traditionally defined based on the victim’s actions.
7
   
Feminist reforms led to significant changes in the criminal definition of rape.  For 
example, rape reformers fought to abolish the utmost resistance requirement and achieved 
substantial success.
8
  Today at least thirty-seven states have removed all references to resistance 
in their statutory definitions of rape or have specifically noted that resistance is not required.
9
  
                                              
4
  See e.g., Brown v. State, 106 N.W. 536, 538 (*Wis. 1906) (requiring “the most vehement exercise of every 
physical means or faculty within the woman’s power to resist the penetration of her person,” including with her 




  See Anderson, supra note 3, at 964.  Statistics show that a very small percentage of rape victims report 
fighting back against their assailants.  See Bureau of Justice Statistics, Highlights from 20 Years of Surveying Crime 
Victims 30 (1993).   
 
6
  As a first step toward abolishing the utmost resistance requirement, some states changed their definition of 
rape to require “earnest resistance” or “reasonable resistance.”  See Anderson, supra note 3, at 964-66.  
 
7
  Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 Yale L.J. 1087, 1094 (1986).    
 
8
   See Anderson, supra note 3, at 959, 969-74.   
 
9
  Id. at 966-67.    
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But definitional problems persist.  In some states, some form of resistance by the victim is still 
an element of rape.
10
  Furthermore, “[e]ven in the absence of a formal resistance requirement, 
many courts continue to define force and nonconsent in terms of the woman’s resistance.”
11
 
It is easy to critique various definitions of rape, but it is difficult to create a rape 
definition that does not in some way depend on evaluating the actions or state of mind of the 
victim.  In some states, the use of force above and beyond the sexual act itself is one element of 
rape.
12
  A definition that requires force may not seem to focus on the victim’s conduct.  But 
often, an assailant uses force only when a victim resists.  In fact, the level of force required is 
often defined as “force sufficient to overcome the victim’s will” or force necessary to overcome 
resistance.
13
  As such, force requirements often double as resistance requirements.  But in the 
absence of a force requirement, the definition of rape turns on the nonconsensual nature of the 
contact.  Inquiries into the presence or absence of consent focus on the victim’s state of mind and 
create the dynamic of “he said she said” in rape prosecutions.   
There are many pitfalls in the drafting and interpretation of a rape statute.  And as 




                                              
10
  See, e.g., State v. Jones, ___ P.3d ___, 2011 WL 4011738 at *5 (explaining that Idaho is one of the few 
remaining states to require resistance to prove rape and that Idaho fails to specify what type of resistance will 
suffice).    
 
11
   Anderson, supra note 3, at 968.   
 
12
  See, e.g., Stokes v. State, 648 So. 2d 1179 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994) (acknowledging that the prosecution 
must show physical force or threat of force in order to demonstrate the forcible compulsion element); State v. 
Soderquist, 816 P.2d 1264, 1266 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991) (stating that the force necessary to constitute rape is not 
simply the force inherent in the penetration, but the force used to overcome resistance).  
 
13
 See Joshua Mark Fried, Forcing the Issue: an Analysis of the Various Standards of Forcible Compulsion in Rape, 
23 Pepp. L. Rev. 1277, 1292 (1996).   
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III. Minnesota’s Criminal Sexual Conduct Statutes14 
Minnesota criminalizes five degrees of CSC crimes.  The basic conduct prohibited is 
nonconsensual sexual contact
15
 or nonconsensual sexual penetration.
16
  Fifth-degree CSC, the 
lowest degree, prohibits nonconsensual sexual contact.
17
  The higher degrees of CSC require 
additional elements.  The aggravators which drive the increase in degree are the use of force or 
coercion
18
 to accomplish the sexual act and personal injury to the victim.  The next two degrees 
of CSC require force as an aggravating element in addition to nonconsensual contact and 
nonconsensual penetration, respectively.  Fourth-degree CSC requires nonconsensual sexual 
contact and force.
19
  Third-degree CSC requires nonconsensual sexual penetration and force.
20
  
The two highest degrees of CSC require injury as an aggravating element in addition to force and 
nonconsensual conduct.  Second-degree CSC requires sexual contact, force, and personal 
                                              
14
  Minnesota’s CSC statutes also prohibit some conduct that is outside the purview of this article.  For 
example, other conduct prohibited as first-degree CSC includes sexual penetration when the victim is a certain age 
in relation to the assailant, sexual penetration involving the use of a deadly weapon, and sexual penetration of a 
person who is mentally incapacitated.  Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(a), (b), (d), (e)(ii).    
 
15
  Minn. Stat. § 609.341, subd. 11 (2010).  
 
16
  Minn. Stat. § 609.341, subd. 12 (2010).  
 
17
  Minn. Stat. § 609.3451, subd. 1(1).  Fifth-degree CSC is punishable by up to five years’ imprisonment and 
up to a $3000 fine.  Minn. Stat. § 609.3451, subd. 2 (2010).   
 
18
  This element may be satisfied by proof of either force or coercion.  However, as explained below, proof of 
nonconsensual contact or penetration necessarily involves proof of force under Minnesota law.  Minnesota courts 
hold that proof of a nonconsensual sexual act in itself is sufficient proof of force.  Therefore, even though a 
prosecutor could pursue a CSC conviction based on coercion, it is unclear why any prosecutor would choose to do 
so.  For this reason, I refer to this element throughout the article as a force element.  
 
19
  Minn. Stat. § 609.345, subd. 1(c).  Fourth-degree CSC is punishable by up to ten years’ imprisonment and 
up to a $20, 000 fine.  Minn. Stat. § 609.345, subd. 2 (2010).   
 
20
  Minn. Stat. § 609.344, subd. 1(c).  Third-degree CSC is punishable by up to fifteen years’ imprisonment 
and up to a $30,000 fine.  Minn. Stat. § 609.344, subd. 2 (2010).   
 
DRAFT




  First-degree CSC requires sexual penetration, force, and personal injury.
22
   So the 
statutory scheme for CSC in Minnesota looks like this: 
 
CSC 5: Contact    
CSC 4: Contact +  Force  
CSC 3: Penetration + Force  
CSC 2: Contact + Force + Personal injury 
CSC 1: Penetration + Force + Personal Injury 
  
IV. Problems with the Minnesota CSC Statutes 
As a result of problematic statutory definitions and interpretations by the courts, the force 
and injury aggravator elements in the Minnesota CSC statutes overlap.  The same conduct can 
satisfy both elements and thus different degrees of CSC prohibit the exact same conduct.  Instead 
of five degrees of CSC, Minnesota really has something like two.   
  a.  Definitional Problems 
  Some of the problems with the CSC statutes originate in the statutory language.  It is 
plain from the statutory definitions that the elements of force and injury overlap.  Force is 
defined as  
the infliction, attempted infliction, or threatened infliction by the actor of bodily 
harm or commission or threat of any other crime by the actor against the 
complainant or another, which (a) causes the complainant to reasonably believe 
that the actor has the present ability to execute the threat and (b) if the actor does 
                                              
21
  Minn. Stat. § 609.343, subd. 1(e)(i).  Second-degree CSC is punishable by up to twenty-five years’ 
imprisonment and up to a $35,000 fine.  Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 2 (2010).   
 
22
  Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(e)(i).  First-degree CSC is punishable by up to thirty years’ imprisonment 
and up to a $40,000 fine.  Minn. Stat. § 609.341, subd. 2(a) (2010).   
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Personal injury is defined as “bodily harm as defined in section 609.02, subdivision 7, or severe 
mental anguish or pregnancy.”
24
  Setting aside for a moment the quantum of harm required by 
the statutory definition of bodily harm, the mere fact that both the force and injury elements use 
the same term—bodily harm—is highly problematic.  The force element is satisfied if the 
assailant inflicts bodily harm while the injury element is satisfied if the victim suffers bodily 
harm at the hands of the assailant.  Using the bodily harm standard twice ensures that both (or 
neither) elements will be satisfied in every case.  If a rape involves bodily harm, inflicted by the 
assailant and suffered by the victim, then both the force and personal injury aggravators are 
satisfied.  In every case where the prosecution can prove force based on the infliction of bodily 
harm, it must necessarily be able to prove personal injury.      
 This overlap in the definitions of force and injury is exacerbated by the actual definition 
of bodily harm.  Bodily harm is defined as “physical pain or injury, illness, or any impairment of 
physical condition.”
25
  Any physical pain qualifies as bodily harm.  So, in the context of CSC, 
the infliction of any physical pain satisfies the force element, and if the victim suffers any 
amount of pain, personal injury is also satisfied.  It is common sense that every nonconsensual 
penetration involves physical pain, inflicted by the assailant and suffered by the victim.  
Moreover, the definition of personal injury includes mental anguish.  Even if it is possible that 
any nonconsensual sexual penetration or contact can occur without physical pain, undoubtedly 
the victim will suffer some mental anguish.   
                                              
23
  Minn. Stat. § 609.341, subd. 3 (2010) (emphasis added). 
  
24
  Minn. Stat. § 609.341, subd. 8 (2010) (emphasis added).   
 
25
  Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 7 (2010).   
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The overlapping definitions and the low threshold for personal injury mean that in 
virtually every rape case, the state can prove both the force and personal injury. The crime of 
third-degree CSC is essentially meaningless because successfully proving a third-degree CSC 
necessarily involves proving the elements of first-degree CSC, the only additional element being 
injury.  Likewise proving the elements of fourth-degree CSC necessarily involves proving the 
elements of second-degree CSC, the only difference being injury.  So any putative fourth-degree 
CSC can be charged as second-degree and every third-degree CSC can be charged as first-degree 
CSC.  
 b. Interpretive Problems  
Separate and apart from the statutory definition problems, Minnesota courts have 
interpreted the CSC statutes in ways that further eliminate any distinction between the degrees of 
CSC.  First, Minnesota courts have adopted an intrinsic force standard.  Second, the courts have 
reinforced the minimal personal injury requirement.   
1. Intrinsic force 
There are two different standards courts and legislatures use to define the force 
requirement in rape laws: intrinsic force and extrinsic force.
26
  An extrinsic force standard 
requires the use of force above and beyond the force inherent in the nonconsensual sexual act.
27
  
Intrinsic force, in contrast, holds that the force inherent in the nonconsensual act satisfies the 
force requirement.
28
  The extrinsic force standard is “the more traditional view” and “the most 
commonly adopted” among states.
29
  The United States Supreme Court adopted an extrinsic 
                                              
26
  2 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 17.3(a) (2d ed. 2003).   
 
27
  Id.   
 
28
  Id.   
 
29
   State v. Jones, ___ P.3d ___, 2011 WL 4011738 at *8 (Idaho Ct. App. Sept. 12, 2011).   
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force standard in 1897.
30
  However, “the adoption of the intrinsic force standard is indicative of a 
modern trend toward the eradication of the element of force and is more clearly observed in 
recent court opinions which narrowly construe sexual assault provisions in favor of the victim.”
31
 
Neither the statutory definition of force nor the way the word “force” is used in the CSC 
statutes indicates whether intrinsic or extrinsic force is required in Minnesota.
32
  However, 
Minnesota courts have long interpreted the CSC statutes to require only intrinsic force.  In State 
v. Brouillette, without announcing what type of force standard it employed, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court held that the defendant’s conviction for second-degree CSC was supported by 
sufficient evidence of force when the defendant grabbed the victim’s shoulders and turned her 
around before the sexual contact occurred.
33
  There was conduct in addition to the sexual 
contact—grabbing the victim by her shoulders and turning her around—but no evidence that this 
conduct inflicted bodily harm (pain), as the statutory force definition requires.
34
  In State v. 
Mattson the court also found sufficient evidence to support the force element, based on the 
defendant grabbing the wrist and breast of the victim and pulling the victim partially into his car 
                                                                                                                                                  
 
30
  Mills v. United States, 164 U.S. 644 (1897).   
 
31
  Mark Fried, Forcing the Issue: An Analysis of the Various Standards of Forcible Compulsion in Rape, 23 
Pepp. L. Rev. 1277, 1300 (1996).  
 
32
  In each of the five CSC statutes, the force element states that the actor must use force “to accomplish” the 
nonconsensual sexual act.  Arguably, by requiring that force be used “to accomplish” the act, the plain language of 
the statutes requires extrinsic force.  Using force to accomplish an act is different than force that merely 
accompanies an act.  See In re D.L.K., 381 N.W.2d 435, 437 (Minn. 1986).  The Minnesota Supreme Court has 
rejected this argument.  Id.   
 
33
  286 N.W.2d 702 (Minn. 1979).   
 
34
  When Brouillete was decided, the statutory definition of force referenced the statutory definition of assault.  
However, because the definition of assault included the infliction of bodily harm, the force definition that applied in 
Brouillete is consistent with the current force definition.   Although there was no allegation of bodily harm in 
Brouillete, the opinion suggests that the force element may have been satisfied instead by the defendant’s act 
causing fear of harm in the victim.  
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through an open window.
35
  The court did not explain what kind of force standard it applied.  In 
Mattson there was evidence that the victim felt pain, but it was unclear whether it was the act of 
grabbing her wrist or grabbing her breast (or both) that caused the pain.
36
  Brouilette and Mattson 
suggested that Minnesota required only intrinsic force to satisfy the force element.  Neither case 
involved the clear infliction of bodily harm in addition to the sexual conduct—at least, the court 
did not isolate the pain caused by the sexual contact from any other pain suffered by the 
victims—and still the court upheld both convictions.  
The court more clearly adopted what it had previously suggested, the intrinsic force 
standard, in In re D.L.K.
37
  D.L.K. approached a female classmate, tapped her on the shoulder, 
and when she turned around, grabbed and pinched her breast hard enough to cause her pain.
38
  
The only forceful conduct inflicting bodily harm in the form of pain was the sexual contact itself, 
pinching the victim’s breast.
39
  The court held that the nonconsensual sexual contact was by itself 
sufficient force to satisfy the CSC force element.
40
  The court rejected D.L.K’s argument that the 
statute drafters intended to create an extrinsic force standard by requiring that force be used “to 
accomplish” the sexual act, and instead determined that the force element is satisfied when the 
actor uses force “while accomplishing” the contact.
41
  The court thus concluded that the “sudden 
                                              
35
  376 N.W.2d 413, 415 (Minn. 1985).   
 
36
  It is likely that the act of grabbing the victim’s wrist and pulling her through an open car window caused 
her pain in addition to the pain from the sexual act of grabbing her breast.  Thus it is likely that the facts in Mattson 
would have satisfied an extrinsic force requirement as well.    
 
37
  381 N.W.2d 435 (Minn. 1986).   
 
38
  Id. at 436.   
 
39
   Id. at 437.  
 
40
  Id. at 438 (“[W]e have found the requirement of force in [CSC crimes] satisfied when the actor inflicts 
bodily harm or pain or the threat thereof on another while accomplishing sexual contact.”) (emphasis added).  
 
41
  Id. at 437-38.  
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and painful grabbing and pinching of the victim’s breast is sufficient use of force to accomplish 
sexual contact,” although that use of force was one and the same as the sexual contact itself.
42
   
There are reasonable arguments in support of an intrinsic force standard.  An intrinsic 
force standard recognizes that nonconsensual sexual acts are inherently forceful and that those 
acts involve some physical pain.  Undoubtedly the Minnesota courts chose an intrinsic force 
standard out of concern for rape victims and with a desire to shift focus away from victims’ 
actions.  But by trying to solve one problem the courts have created another.  In the context of 
Minnesota’s statutory scheme for CSC, the intrinsic force requirement means we have an 
aggravator that is essentially meaningless and a resulting overlap in degrees of CSC.  The 
addition of the force element is the only difference between fifth-degree CSC and fourth-degree 
CSC.  But because the intrinsic force standard will always be satisfied by nonconsensual sexual 
contact, there is no distinction between fifth-degree CSC and fourth-degree CSC.   
2. Personal injury 
Minnesota courts have also reinforced the low bodily harm standard for the injury 
element.  The courts have explained that minimal injury is sufficient to satisfy the personal injury 
element of CSC.
43
  As long as a victim testifies that she felt pain, the personal injury element is 
satisfied.
44
  Any injury that weakens or damages an individual’s physical condition is also 
sufficient to satisfy the personal injury element.
45
  An injury “need not be coincidental with 
actual sexual penetration” to satisfy the personal injury element, but needs “only be sufficiently 
                                                                                                                                                  
 
42
  Id. at 438. 
 
43
  State v. Bowser, 307 N.W.2d 778, 779 (Minn. 1981).  
 
44
  See id.  
 
45
  State v. Jarvis, 665 N.W.2d 518, 522 (Minn. 2003).   
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related to the act.”
46
  The Minnesota Supreme Court has acknowledged that only a “minimal 
amount of pain or injury” is required to satisfy the personal injury element.
47
   
The courts have confirmed that the personal injury element has a very low threshold.  The 
personal injury element will be satisfied by any nonconsensual sexual act.  Nonconsensual sexual 
acts necessarily involve pain or mental anguish, either of which can constitute bodily harm.  
Because the injury element will be satisfied in every case, by proving third-degree CSC the state 
can necessarily prove first-degree CSC and likewise by proving fifth or fourth-degree CSC the 
state can necessarily prove second-degree CSC.  The only aggravating element between third and 
first-degree CSC and fourth and second-degree CSC is injury.   
c. The result of overlapping elements 
To prove fifth-degree CSC, the state has to show a nonconsensual sexual contact.  
Because the contact, by itself, satisfies the intrinsic force requirement, the exact same act 
satisfies all the elements of fourth-degree CSC, because the only additional element is force.  
Moreover, proof of that exact same sexual contact will undoubtedly involve either some pain to 
the victim or some mental anguish or both, thus satisfying the injury element–the only additional 
element of second-degree CSC.  Identical conduct can just as easily satisfy the elements of 
second-degree CSC as fifth-degree CSC.  Similarly, the same act of sexual penetration 
accompanied by force that is required for third-degree CSC necessarily establishes first-degree 
CSC.  The only additional element of first-degree CSC, personal injury, will be satisfied by the 
same evidence that demonstrated force, or by the penetration itself.  Thus, the CSC statutes in 
Minnesota really look more like this: 
 
                                              
46
  State v. Sollman, 402 N.W.2d 634, 636 (Minn. 1987).   
 
47
  Jarvis, 665 N.W.2d at 522.   
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CSC 5: Contact    
CSC 4: Contact  Force/Coercion  
CSC 3: Penetration  Force/Coercion  
CSC 2: Contact  Force/Coercion + Personal injury 
CSC 1: Penetration  Force/Injury + Personal Injury 
 
 
V. The CSC Statutes Violate Equal Protection 
 The overlap described above leads to significant sentencing disparity.  Two defendants 
who commit identical acts can receive drastically different sentences, based only on charging 
decisions of the prosecutors.  For example, defendants who commit the exact same conduct can 
be charged with and convicted of either first-degree CSC or third-degree CSC.  As explained 
above, proving the elements of third-degree CSC (penetration, force) will always entail proving 
the only additional element of first-degree CSC (injury).  A defendant convicted of third-degree 
CSC can be sentenced to fifteen years’ imprisonment.  Another defendant who commits the 
exact same conduct but is charged with first-degree CSC can receive thirty years’ imprisonment.  
That’s a sentence twice as long based on no discernible difference between the defendants or 
their conduct.   
 The CSC statutes place significant power in the hands of prosecutors.  The same 
nonconsensual sexual contact can be charged as either fifth, fourth, or second-degree CSC.  And 
the same nonconsensual sexual penetration can be charged as either third or first-degree CSC.  A 
trio of cases demonstrates the significant prosecutorial discretion in charging CSC crimes.  State 
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 In re D.L.K.,
49
 and In re A.A.M.
50
 involved nearly identical conduct: the defendant 
grabbed the victim’s breast.  In each case the victim testified that she experienced pain.  The 
defendants’ convictions were upheld in each case.  And yet each was charged with a different 
degree of CSC.  Mattson was charged with second-degree CSC;
51
 D.L.K. was adjudicated 
delinquent based on fourth-degree CSC;
52
 A.A.M. was adjudicated delinquent based on fifth-
degree CSC.
53
  There are some differences in the facts of these cases.  For example Mattson, who 
was charged with the highest degree of CSC of the three, grabbed his victim such that she was 
pulled through an open window of his car.
54
  However, the sexual contact in each case was 
exactly the same.  The minimal injury requirement and the intrinsic force requirement combine 
so that one act can be charged in three different ways.   This potential for unfairly disparate 
sentences is an equal protection violation. 
 Minnesota’s CSC statutes have been upheld against constitutional challenges for 
vagueness and due process violations.
55
  But no Minnesota appellate court has yet assessed 
whether the CSC statutes deny equal protection of the laws.  The Minnesota Supreme Court 
recently addressed Minnesota’s equal protection doctrine in State v. Cox.
56
  Cox was charged 
                                              
48
  372 N.W.2d 413 (Minn. 1985). 
 
49
  381 N.W.2d 435 (Minn. 1986).   
 
50
  684 N.W.2d 925 (Minn. 2004).  
 
51
  372 N.W.2d at 414. 
 
52
  381 N.W.2d at 436. 
 
53
  684 N.W.2d at 927.  
 
54
  372 N.W.2d at 414. 
 
55
  See State v. Reinke, 343 N.W.2d 660 (Minn. 1984); State v. Lattin, 336 N.W.2d 270 (Minn. 1983). 
 
56
  798 N.W.2d 517 (Minn. 2011). 
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with issuing a dishonored check.
57
  She filed a motion to dismiss the charges, arguing that there 
was a sentencing disparity between the crimes of issuing a dishonored check and theft by 
check.
58
  Although issuing a dishonored check is a lesser-included offense of theft by check, in 
some circumstances, based on the value of the checks at issue, issuing a dishonored check is 
punishable by a harsher sentence than theft by check.
59
  The value of the checks in Cox was 
$515.83, which was a felony under the issuing a dishonored check statute, but would have been a 
gross misdemeanor under the theft by check statute.
60
 
 The Minnesota Supreme Court explained that Cox’s equal protection claim turned on 
whether Cox could demonstrate that she was similarly situated to persons treated differently.
61
  
To determine whether two groups are similarly situated, the court asks whether they are “alike in 
all relevant respects.”
62
  In a case challenging sentence disparity in criminal statutes, “the critical 
factor is whether the two statutes prohibit the same conduct.”
63
  “A statute violates the equal 
protection clause when it prescribes different punishments for the same conduct committed under 
the same circumstances by persons similarly situated.”
64
  In assessing the challenged statutes, the 
court asks whether the elements of the statutes are “the same or essentially similar.”
65
  In sum,  
                                              
57
  Id. at 518. 
 
58
  Id. at 519. 
 
59
  Id. 
 
60
  Id. at 520. 
 
61
  Id. at 521. 
 
62
  Id. at 522. 
 
63
  Id. 
 
64
  Id. (citing State v. Frazier, 649 N.W.2d 829, 837  (Minn. 2010)) 
 
65
  Id. (citing Frazier, 649 N.W.2d at 837). 
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in order for a defendant to prevail on an equal-protection claim based on the 
disparity in sentencing for two different offenses, the defendant must first show 
that a person who is convicted of committing one offense is similarly situated to 
people who are convicted of committing the other offense.  In order to 
demonstrate this, a defendant must show that the two statutes prohibit the same 





In Cox, the court began its analysis
67
 by comparing the two challenged statutes, issuing a 
dishonored check and theft by check.
68
  The court next considered whether Cox’s conduct would 
have supported a conviction for theft by check (in addition to issuing a dishonored check).
69
  The 
court concluded that Cox’s conduct would not have supported a conviction for theft by check 
because the theft by check had a different mens rea requirement than issuing a dishonored 
check.
70
  Theft by check required the state to prove that the defendant had fraudulent intent 
whereas issuing a dishonored check required the state to prove that the defendant intended that 
the check not be paid, which can be proven by a showing that the defendant failed to respond to 
notices of nonpayment.
71
  The facts alleged in the complaint supported the latter mens rea 
because Cox failed to respond to notices of nonpayment, but did not show that Cox had any 
                                              
66
  Id. at 523. 
 
67
   The court noted that Minnesota has “not always followed federal law in interpreting our state Equal 
Protection Clause.”  Id. at 521 (citing State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886, 888 (Minn. 1991)).  As Justice Stras noted 
in his concurring opinion, there is some uncertainty about how courts evaluate equal protection claims under the 
Minnesota Constitution.  Id. at 525 (Stras, J., concurring).  This may be because “the Minnesota Constitution, unlike 
the United States Constitution, makes no mention of Equal Protection rights.”  Id. at 526; see also Minn. Const. art. I 
§ 2 (“[N]o member of this state shall be disenfranchised or derived of any of the rights or privileges secured to any 
citizen thereof unless by the law of the land or the judgment of his peers.”) However, the majority in Cox reaffirmed 
Minnesota’s unique equal protection jurisprudence and analyzed Cox’s claim without reference to federal equal 
protection law.   
 
68
  Id. at 523. 
  
69
  Id. at 524. 
 
70
  Id. at 523-24. 
 
71
  Id. 
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intent to defraud as required for theft by check.
72
  The court held that Cox’s conduct would not 
support a conviction for theft by check and so she had not proven that she was similarly situated 
to a person convicted of theft by check.
73
   
 Under the standard applied in Cox, the CSC statutes violate the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Minnesota Constitution.  Take for example first-degree and third-degree CSC (although 
the exact same argument is true of the comparison of second, fourth, and fifth-degree CSC).  To 
survive an equal protection challenge, the state must show an actual difference between the 
statutes—a mere “theoretical” difference is insufficient.
 74
  First and third-degree CSC prohibit 
the exact same conduct.  It is true that first-degree CSC requires one additional element, personal 
injury.
75
  However, this does not mean there is an actual difference between the two statutes.  
Any difference is merely theoretical.  Although theoretically first-degree CSC requires the state 
to prove an additional element, the element of personal injury will necessarily be satisfied in 
every successful prosecution for third-degree CSC.  These statutes create precisely the situation 
the court wrote about in Cox: the same conduct, under the same circumstances, committed by 
defendants in similar circumstances can lead to different penalties.  The exact same conduct 
would support a conviction for either offense.
76
  In any case of nonconsensual sexual penetration, 
the state can prove the elements of first-degree CSC just as easily as the elements for third-
degree CSC.   
                                              
72
  Id. at 525.   
 
73
  Id.  
 
74
  State v .Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886, 889 (Minn. 1991).   
 
75
  Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(c) (2010). 
 
76
  The only way the state can argue that the statutes do not prohibit the same conduct is to demonstrate that it 
is possible to have a third or fourth-degree CSC without injury.  This is paramount to arguing that it is possible that a 
nonconsensual penetration causes no pain or that a nonconsensual contact causes no mental anguish.    
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 At least one Minnesota court has already declared the CSC statutes unconstitutional.  
Defendant Jamie Ray Beach successfully challenged his sentence for first-degree CSC by 
arguing that first and third-degree CSC prohibit the exact same conduct and thus violate equal 
protection principles.
77
  A Dodge County court agreed, finding that Beach’s sentence for first-
degree CSC “is repugnant to individual protections guaranteed under our state and federal 
constitutions.”
78
  In light of Beach’s success, other defendants have raised equal protection 
challenges to the CSC statutes and this issue is currently being litigated.  Should a Minnesota 
appellate court ever agree with Dodge County, the consequences would be far-reaching.  An 
appellate court ruling that the CSC statutes violate equal protection would apply to every 
defendant awaiting trial on CSC charges, every CSC conviction on direct appeal, and every CSC 
conviction not yet final, until the legislature acted to change the law.  Additionally, it is possible 
that such a ruling could have retroactive application and serve as grounds for collateral attack on 
CSC convictions.
79
  Furthermore, every prisoner serving a sentence for a CSC conviction could 
petition the courts for post-conviction relief.  Scores of CSC offenders could be released from 
prison or qualify for a reduction in sentence.     
VI. Solutions 
 The Minnesota Legislature should amend the CSC statutes to remedy the definitional 
overlap between force and injury, the merging of the degrees, and the attendant sentencing 
disparity.  There are many potential solutions.  The legislature could amend the CSC statutes to 
redefine one of the elements and eliminate the definitional overlap between force and injury.  In 
                                              
77
  Order, State v. Beach, No. 20-CR-09-780 at 1 (Dodge County District Court June 6, 2012)  
 
78
  Id.  
 
79
  A ruling that the CSC statutes violate equal protection would not be procedural in nature, so Teague 
doctrine restricting the retroactivity of new rules of constitutional criminal procedure would not apply.  See Danforth 
v. State, 761 N.W.2d 493, 496 (Minn. 2009).      
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the alternative, the legislature could alter the statutory structure and reduce the number of 
degrees of CSC crimes.  
 a. Force 
 The legislature could adopt an extrinsic force standard and amend the definition of force 
in the CSC statutes to make it clear the state must prove a use of force above and beyond that 
inherent in the nonconsensual sexual act to satisfy the force element.  This would provide a 
partial solution that would differentiate fifth and fourth-degree CSC.  If the force element 
required infliction of harm beyond that inherent in the sexual act, proof of the sexual act alone 
would no longer satisfy both the act element and the force element.  Fourth and fifth-degree CSC 
would be distinct crimes.  However, if the new extrinsic force requirement maintained the bodily 
harm standard as the measure of the required force, the overlap between the force element and 
injury element would remain.  By proving force above and beyond the sexual act, the infliction 
of bodily harm (pain) on the victim, the state would still necessarily prove that the victim 
suffered bodily harm, satisfying the injury element.  So the sentencing disparity between second 
and fourth-degree CSC and first and third-degree CSC would still violate equal protection.   
Minnesota courts have demonstrated that they find an extrinsic force requirement 
distasteful.
80
  An extrinsic force requirement can tilt the focus of rape cases too much toward the 
victim’s resistance and trivialize the obvious use of force inherent in all rapes.  Minnesota’s 
current statutory scheme expresses a policy decision that nonconsensual sexual contact 
accomplished by force is more serious than nonconsensual sexual contact without any use of 
force.
81
  The legislature could also decide to abandon this distinction, perhaps in recognition that 
                                              
80
  See D.L.K., 381 N.W.2d at 437-38.  
 
81
  Again, based on the intrinsic force standard, it is impossible to have a nonconsensual sexual contact that 
does not involve force.  But the structure of the Minnesota CSC statutes assumes that a difference is possible. 
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all nonconsensual sexual contact is forceful, and eliminate force as an aggravator.  But if the 
legislature chooses to maintain the distinction and keep force as an aggravator, force has to mean 
something more than nonconsensual sexual conduct.  
b. Injury 
 The legislature could additionally or alternatively change the definition of injury.  A 
heightened injury standard would ensure that there is some difference between second and 
fourth-degree CSC and between first and third-degree CSC.  Injury cannot be used as an 
aggravator if it is defined as any physical pain.  Physical pain is inherent in the very nature of 
rape.  Furthermore, the definition of the harm required for the injury element must be different 
than the harm required for the force element.  If not, both elements (or neither) will be met in 
every case.  One model for levels of harm already exists in the Minnesota Statutes.  There are 
three levels of harm defined in section 609.02: bodily harm, substantial bodily harm, and great 
bodily harm.
82
  The legislature could easily import these definitions into the CSC statutes, in any 
number of ways.  The legislature could use substantial bodily harm or great bodily harm as new 
standards for extrinsic force and/or injury.  For example, the legislature could amend the CSC 
statutes to state that that force requires the actor to inflict substantial bodily harm as defined in 
Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 7(a) or that injury means great bodily harm as defined in Minn. Stat. 
§ 609.02, subd. 8.  As long as a different quantum of harm is required for each element, the 
                                              
82
  Subd. 7. Bodily harm. “Bodily harm” means physical pain or injury, illness, or any impairment of physical 
condition. 
Subd. 7a. Substantial bodily harm. “Substantial bodily harm” means bodily injury which involves a 
temporary but substantial disfigurement, or which causes a temporary but substantial loss or impairment of the 
function of any bodily member or organ, or which causes a fracture of any bodily member. 
Subd. 8. Great bodily harm. “Great bodily harm” means bodily injury which creates a high probability of 
death, or which causes serious permanent disfigurement, or which causes a permanent or protracted loss or 
impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ or other serious bodily harm. 
 
Minn. Stat. § 609.02 (2010). 
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aggravators would not overlap.  Alternatively, the legislature could create a structure where the 
degrees of CSC correlate to different levels of injury, with substantial bodily harm representing 
one degree and great bodily harm representing a higher degree.   
 c. Reduce the number of degrees 
 These suggestions could work in conjunction with a reduction in the number of degrees 
of CSC.  The purpose of a structure with several degrees of the same crime is to provide harsher 
punishment for more objectionable conduct.  Minnesota’s CSC statutes represent several 
decisions about what conduct to punish most harshly.  CSC crimes involving penetration are 
punished more harshly than those involving contact.  CSC crimes involving the use of force by 
the assailant are punished more harshly than those where force is not present.  And CSC crimes 
where the victim suffers injury are punished more harshly that those where the victim is not 
injured.  These distinctions are only theoretical in Minnesota because the legislature and the 
courts have made it impossible to separate out the worst crimes and criminals.  Every CSC crime 
involving penetration can be punished at the first-degree level.  And every CSC crime involving 
contact can be punished at the second-degree level.  The Minnesota Legislature needs to ensure 
that the different degrees of CSC prohibit different conduct, some punishable more harshly than 
others.  By eliminating the sentencing disparity resulting from the current overlap, the legislature 
can also ensure that the worst offenders are punished most harshly. 
  There are myriad ways the legislature could restructure the CSC statutes.  But, to achieve 
the goal of eliminating sentencing disparity, any restructuring must bear in mind two key 
principles.  First, if Minnesota maintains an intrinsic force requirement, force cannot be an 
aggravating element.  Second, if injury is defined as physical pain, it cannot be an aggravator.  
One potential revision could consist of a base offense (say third-degree) defined as 
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nonconsensual sexual acts.  Second-degree could contain the additional element of extrinsic 
force.  And first-degree could add the element of injury, as long as the definition of injury 
requires a level of harm higher than that required for the force element.   
 Another option, which mirrors the current differentiation of sexual contact and sexual 
penetration, could involve two crimes: one prohibiting nonconsensual sexual contact and one 
prohibiting nonconsensual sexual penetration.  Force and injury, properly defined, could serve as 
aggravators for each crime.  A particularly simplistic approach would be to remove 
considerations of force and injury altogether and define CSC as nonconsensual sexual contact or 
penetration, and nothing more.   
 d. My proposal 
 First, the legislature should eliminate force as an aggravator for CSC crimes.  Second, the 
legislature should amend the CSC statutes to create two separate injury aggravators, defined as 
substantial bodily harm and great bodily harm, respectively. The legislature should maintain the 
separation of sexual contact and sexual penetration.  But to simplify the statutory structure, the 
legislature should treat nonconsensual sexual contact and nonconsensual sexual penetration as 
different crimes instead of different degrees of the same crime.  The lowest degree of each crime 
should prohibit the nonconsensual sexual act (contact or penetration), the next highest degree 
should include the aggravator of substantial bodily harm, and the highest degree should include 
the aggravator of great bodily harm.
83




                                              
83
  The legislature may include other aggravators that are outside the scope of this article, such as the use of a 
dangerous weapon and knowledge that the victim is mentally incapacitated.   
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Nonconsensual sexual contact 
Third degree Contact  
Second degree Contact +  Substantial bodily harm 
First degree  Contact +  Great bodily harm 
 
Nonconsensual sexual penetration 
Third degree Penetration  
Second degree Penetration + Substantial bodily harm 
First degree Penetration + Great bodily harm 
 
This proposal for a simplified CSC structure would be easy to apply in practice, and most 
importantly, would fix the equal protection problem of sentencing disparity resulting from 
overlapping degrees of the current CSC statutes.  Yet I believe this proposal is true to the 
underlying principles of the current statutes.  The force and injury aggravators show that 
Minnesota wanted to punish most harshly perpetrators who cause the most harm to their victims. 
Minnesota attempts to single out perpetrators who “use[] force” and “cause personal injury” to 
their victims for higher punishments.  But any hierarchical system of rape statutes with higher 
punishments for higher degrees rests on an uncomfortable assertion:  some rapists should be 
punished more harshly than others, which must mean that some nonconsensual sexual acts are 
worse than others.   
Understandably, the Minnesota Legislature and courts are reluctant to make such an 
assertion, even if it is embedded in the statutory structure.  Instead, Minnesota lawmakers and 
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judges have emphasized a different truth:  Every single nonconsensual act is forceful and causes 
pain or mental anguish to the victim.  Every nonconsensual sexual act is a horrendous violation 
of the victim and should be punished harshly.  I wholeheartedly agree.   
The point of my proposed changes is not to make it harder for prosecutors to obtain  CSC 
convictions.  The legislature must always tread carefully in this area and must not revert to the 
common law, where rape was nearly impossible to prove.  But Minnesota has gone too far the 
other way.  Well-intentioned people have unwittingly made missteps in pursuit of a noble goal—
supporting rape victims, in part by ensuring conviction and punishment of their rapists.  The 
problem with the current CSC statutes is not simply that it is easy to prove the aggravating 
elements of heightened degrees.  The problem is the resulting sentencing disparity that ultimately 
could lead to convicted rapists being freed from prison.  
We’ve chosen to draw lines in Minnesota and these lines have to mean something.  The 
problems discussed above prevent any distinction among perpetrators and victims.  My proposed 
changes would ensure that perpetrators who cause the most harm to their victims are punished 
most harshly.  But my proposal does not prevent the legislature from punishing even third degree 
nonconsensual contact and penetration at a high level.  Making these distinctions and drawing 
these lines is emotionally difficult.  But if we are to live by the rule of law, meaningful lines 
must be drawn.     
VII. Conclusion 
The Minnesota CSC statutes violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Minnesota 
Constitution because different degrees of CSC prohibit the exact same conduct and the statutes 
prescribe different punishments for the same conduct committed under the same circumstances 
by persons similarly situated.  There are numerous ways to fix the problem.  No matter how the 
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legislature chooses to remedy the sentencing disparity, it must ensure that the degrees of CSC 
prohibit different conduct.  Any aggravators in the statutory scheme must be distinct.  The 
Minnesota Legislature must act swiftly.  One court has already found the CSC statutes 
unconstitutional.  A similar ruling from an appellate court could effectively invalidate the 
sentences of scores of prisoners with CSC convictions.  And until this problem is solved, every 
defendant currently serving a sentence for a CSC conviction could challenge the sentence on 
equal protection grounds, seeking a reduction in sentence.   
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